Archive for June, 2019
I am sure no one will read this but I will keep writing because I am almost done for all that it matters. In the second half of the book’s main chapter Kimhi focuses on the structure of assertions in Aristotle. Following Kimhi’s central division of categorematic and syncategorematic he argues that statements are divided […]
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The central chapter of Kimhi’s Thinking and Being wanders far into the Aristotelian weeds – arguing that consistent misreadings of the notion of being in Aristotle’s work has closed the possibility which Kimhi has attempted in the first half of the book to re-open – namely that thought must be considered as a two-way capacity for action. […]
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Tags: Aristotelian logic, assertion, Frege, irad kimhi, logic, WIttgenstein
Naught Thought 