Archive for the ‘Harman’ Category

One of the rhetorical disadvantages to philosophies of process, or dispositions, or becoming (or however else you want to couch them) is that there’s a fuzziness that there doesn’t seem to be an urge to clarify. Part of this is the fact that these philosophies are non-common sensical and are therefore ontologically fuzzy – one […]


Several interesting conferences coming up: 1 – The schedule for the next Dundee conference on 21st century idealisms is here. 2-The schedule for the Cyclonopedia event in NYC on March 11th is here. 3-The first issue of continent (an onlline journal started by some fellow EGSers) is available online here. I have a short piece […]


Against the limitations of time I have been trying to get some sense of what happened in California in the last week in regards to OOO and, in particular, its relation to process philosophy. This contrast and/or relation is no doubt due to Whitehead has being pulled into both camps. Furthermore, a set of exchanges […]


In a very interesting post, Graham Harman discusses Meillassoux’s philosophy as a philosophy of immanence. He writes: “What Meillassoux claims to prove is that the things-in-themselves would exist even if all humans were extinguished. Thus, the things can exist without us. However, in order for something to be a thing-in-itself, it is not enough simply […]


In chapter five of Vibrant Matter Bennett turns her attention to vitalism in order to flesh out her project of a vital materialism. As with the previous chapter, Bennett notes the importance of annhilating  distinctions. What kinds of distinctions are being dissolved and in what fashion is a problem obscured in the term materialism. As […]


/3/ – Vitalism, instead of being taken as a singular life-force which animates or enlivens all things, is instead taken to be a collection of forces compromising a larger prohairesis which disintegrates what we take to be the solidity of being both in creation, destruction, and transformation. As a result the organic/inorganic distinction is not an ontological distinction. So near so […]


In response to Graham: It is not that I don’t think Badiou, Lacan, and Zizek are not idealist, or have idealist tendencies at the least, but simply that throwing them into the same lot as self-admitting idealists misses something. SR and TM will pass each other like ships in the night if Hegelianism is thrown into […]



Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 249 other followers