Schelling against anti-realists?
Reading posts over at Larval Subjects brought this to mind.
From the 1813 draft of the Weltalter:
“But another sort of sophistry misuses the concept of what-is-not in another way. For this concept is supposed to serve as a proof that being is not comprehensible, from which this sophistry further concludes that absolutely nothing is comprehensible. For it does not know how to raise itself above blind feeling, which actually has only an immediate reference to being. Because being is based on darkness with respect to its force, or on an active opposition to essence and everything related to essence, it seems inexpressable and incomprehensible; or as one of the ancients has said in a different conext, only comprehensible to the noncomprehending. Consequently, this sophistry drew the conclusion that all knowing that actually knows dissolves and destroys being, and that true knowing could only consist in non-knowing. An incomparable doctrine – to serve the interests of comfort! For the Real is, precisely on account of its problematic relation to comprehension, all the less easy to comprehend and harder to penetrate. It requires dilligence and mental effort to become comprehensible; in contrast, the Ideal is more easily and immediately comprehended because it is by nature related to what comprehends.”
Filed under: ontology, Schelling, Speculative Realism | Leave a Comment
Tags: ages of the world